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ABSTRACT
Defeasible argumentation is one of the approaches
that attempt to address the challenges arising when
we reason defeasibly, with several formalisms in the
literature reaching a mature state. Nowadays, several
of them started shifting their semantics towards a di-
alectical characterization. Therefore, we believe that
a sufficiently generic model of the process of dialecti-
cal reasoning could also serve as an abstract model of
what happens inside an argumentative systems.
To that end, in this article we lay the foundations
required for such a generic model, proposing a line
of research whose central objective is attaining that
abstract semantics for argumentative systems.
Keywords: knowledge representation, defeasible
reasoning, argumentation, dialectics.
1 INTRODUCTION
The start of the 80’s mark a revolution in
the Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
(KR&R) field. For thousands of years monotonic-
ity, the property that assures that current results
will not be invalidated by the mere adding of new
premises, was regarded as a required feature of
KR&R formalisms. However, most intelligent be-
ings (humans included) do not satisfy it, showing
non-monotonic aspects in their regular behavior.
Suddenly, monotonic reasoning became a burden,
deemed to be avoided [3, 10]. To overcome this,
a new kind of reasoning, called defeasible rea-
soning (a form of non-monotonic reasoning too),
emerged as a new field within the KR&R commu-
nity. In this context, defeasible argumentation [4]
is one of the approaches that address the new
challenges arising when we attempt to reason de-
feasibly.
Nowadays, defeasible argumentation has be-
come one of the hottest topics in defeasible rea-
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soning, with several formalisms in the literature
reaching a mature state [12, 17, 8, 5, 1]. Granted,
most of these system share several key aspects
among them. For instance, in an article survey-
ing the state of the art in argumentation systems,
Prakken and Vreeswijk [9] identified the following
core notions, common to every formalism:
1. They provide an underlying logic.
2. They formally define the concept of argu-
ment.
3. They capture when two arguments are in
conflict.
4. They also capture when an argument defeats
another.
5. They provide a mechanism for determining
the ultimate state of arguments.
Every argumentative system begins by defining
an underlying logic where knowledge is initially
codified. Even though these systems behave non-
monotonically, most of these logics tend to define
a monotonic entailment. The rationale is that
the addition of new premises should allow the
construction of new arguments (possibly chang-
ing the conclusions sanctioned by the system as a
whole), without requiring to invalidate previous
deductions. These arguments, the second notion
in common, are usually associated to proofs or
deductions in this underlaying logic. In this con-
text, an argument is understood as a tentative
piece of reasoning supporting a given conclusion.
However, not every conclusion drawn on this logic
leads to an argument, since these systems usu-
ally impose additional restriction on those deriva-
tions, such as being based on consistent premises,
being minimal, etc.
Regarding the third common aspect, every
system easily allows you to construct argu-
ments for conflicting conclusions. This relation
among arguments is also called attack or counter-
argumentation in some systems. Although the
most obvious form of conflict is the support
of complementary conclusion, an argument may
conflict with another for other reasons, for ex-
ample, when the first denies one of the premises
of the second. Considering that this relation
only captures disagreement between arguments,
it cannot tell appart successful attacks from those
that are not. The relation called defeat, fourth no-
tion common to every argumentative system, is a
refinement of the previous relation that only re-
flects successfull attacks. Note that this relation
captures the conditions under which an argument
is able to deny the conclusive force of another
argument, effectively vanquishing the latter. On
some systems, this relation is called attack as well,
or interference. Even though the conflict relation
is usually symmetric, the defeat relation is usually
not: some sort of argument comparison criterion
is applied to determine which argument prevails
in those reciprocal conflicts.
Finally, defeat alone is not enough to deter-
mine the final state of an argument, as it only
sanctions what is the outcome of the conflict be-
tween two particular arguments. This key no-
tion, also common to every argumentative sys-
tem, is used to determine the set of conclusions
sanctioned by the formalism. Therefore, several
alternatives have been explored in the literature,
for instance fix point vs. constructive seman-
tics, single vs. multiple state assignments, skeptic
vs. credulous semantics, etc. All these proposal
identify at least two disjoint sets: one contain-
ing those arguments that are warranted, and the
other containing those that are not. In a sense, an
arguments is warranted when it is not defeated,
or when its defeaters are in turn defeated, since
defeater are arguments as well. Note that this
process may continue recursively, as long as addi-
tional defeaters of any defeater remain to be con-
sidered. This accounts why warranted arguments
are sometime called undefeated in other theories,
though they have been termed justified or active
as well.
During the 90’s, several prominent formalisms
started shifting their semantics towards a dialec-
tical characterization, abandoning their original
fixpoint semantics or recursive definitions. For
instance, the recursive definition of arguments ac-
tive on a given level from Simari-Loui theory [12]
later became the dialectical analysis structured as
a tree [11], or the fixpoint semantics of the theory
of Prakken and Sartor [7] was then replaced with
the concept of dialogical games [8]. Nowadays,
every major argumentative system has been re-
formulated to accommodate a dialectical variant
of its semantics,1 which generally also became the
preferred way of capturing it.
1with the notably exception of Pollock’s theory [5].
Therefore, a sufficiently generic model of the
process of dialectical reasoning could also serve
as an abstract model of what happens inside an
argumentative systems. To that end, in the next
section we lay the foundations required for such a
generic model, proposing a line of research whose
central objective is attaining that abstract seman-
tics for argumentative systems. Then, in section 3
we briefly explore other works already introduced
in the literature which follow a like approach. Fi-
nally, section 4 presents the conclusions drawn
during this article and outline the work immedi-
ately ahead.
2 KEY ASPECTS OF DIALECTICAL
REASONING
Suppose we want to describe what is going on
inside the mind of an intelligent reasoner imple-
menting a theory of dialectical argumentation.
Lets imagine the context where this reasoning
usually takes place: a given agent comes up
with a new claim, and it is about to weigh the
chance that claim have of being sanctioned. This
claim will be scrutinized under a careful dialec-
tical analysis, where reasons for and against it
are to be considered. Evidently, this agent must
be willing to assume at least two distinctive roles.
Sometimes it will seek out reasons supporting this
claim, but often times it will becomes a sort of
“devil’s advocate”, questioning those very same
reasons it just put forth. Note that this dual-
ity can be observed in most argumentative sys-
tems too, where authors have agreed to call pro-
ponent the role where it supports the claim un-
der consideration, and opponent the role where
it questions it. These reasons being argued for
and against the initial claim are all based upon
the same knowledge base, namely the knowledge
base of the agent performing both roles.
In order to introduce the remaining core no-
tions, we have to resort to a useful analogy
also used to introduce the dialectical flavor of
many argumentative systems: we will conceive
the whole reasoning process in dialectical terms
as if it were a game, where two contenders take
turns to introduce further reasons, either sup-
porting or contradicting the initial claim. This in-
tuitive analogy has been used to convey complex
concepts such as those that make up the dialecti-
cal reformulations of Simari-Loui’s system[11] or
Prakken-Sartor’s theory [8].
Under this conception, one may wonder what a
turn or a move within this dialogical game stands
for. It is clear that each move should either con-
solidate or attack the initial claim, according to
the role being performed. Considering the na-
ture of the systems being modeled, it is safe to
assume that these reasons being put forward will
be structured as logical arguments. With this in
mind, the exchange of these arguments usually
explores a given aspect of the topics being dis-
puted to the fullest extent, until no further argu-
ment can be played addressing that issue, to then
start discussing another aspect, and another as-
pect, until all the aspects of the initial topic are
also exhausted. This behavior is modelled in sev-
eral of the theories of defeasible argumentation
under the term argumentation line [1, 5, 8]. An
argumentation line is a mere sequence of related
moves—an argument, followed by one of its de-
featers, followed in turn by a defeater of this de-
feater, and so on, so forth.
We believe this concept plays a key role upon
which we can erect an abstract model of dialecti-
cal reasoning. In contrast, other alternative mod-
els previously considered in the literature assign
this central role to the argument [6]. Our decision
stem from the fact that the notion of argumen-
tation line is the smallest piece of reasoning still
showing dialectical features; once we go down to
the argument level, it is quite difficult to identify
the role dialectics plays down there. For instance,
we can describe in what state a given dispute is
by providing the set of all the (partial) argumen-
tion lines explored insofar. In a sense, this set of
argumentation lines represents a snapshot of the
dispute being conducted.
Once we are able to formally capture the state
a given dispute can be in, another issues should
also be resolved, such as:
• Which player should move next?
• What is the set of available legal moves?
• Is the dispute over? If so, who has prevailed?
These important aspects should be carefully ad-
dressed, considering that answering these ques-
tions in way entirely reasonable in a given context
can easily preclude this model from being appli-
cable in some other context, where those policies
may no longer be relevant or even feasible. We
can take this into account by not making these de-
cisions, providing only a scheme which should be
later instantiated according to the needs at hand.
For instance, every argumentative systems clearly
states how proponent and opponent should alter-
nate, which arguments can be put forward in a
given context, or what has been the outcome of
the dialectical analysis just performed.
Finally, once we are able to formally model each
of the states that a given dispute may traverse,
we should also capture how these states relate to
each other. In a sense, all the notions briefly in-
troduced so far just model the static side of a
dispute (for instance, which move can be played
next, or which argumentation lines have been ex-
plored so far), but we have not capture its dynam-
ics yet. Not whitstanding, we can easily take its
dynamics into account through a transition func-
tion, which formally models the effect of playing
a given move in the context of a particular state
of a dispute. This transition function by relating
the state of a dispute before and after playing a
given move actually captures the dynamics of the
dialogical game we intend to model.
With this last concept we covered all the rel-
evant aspects involved in the process of dialec-
tical reasoning. In the next section we briefly
overviews other related work present in the liter-
ature.
3 RELATED WORK
To begin with, this approach was first suggested
in a groundbreaking work of R. Loui [2]. The au-
thor considered in the article the existence of a
generic model for argument-based dialectical rea-
soning. He successfully introduced a set of ab-
stract notions that were able to capture the dy-
namics of many attractive theories of defeasible
argumentation. However, Loui involvement with
this line of research was rather tangential since
he was mainly concerned with adding resource-
boundedness into defeasible argumentation.
Later, H. Prakken took Loui’s work in dialec-
tical reasoning into what he calls dynamic de-
bates involving several agents [6]. He proposed
a model of dialectical argumentation in accord to
Loui’s designs, somewhat resembling the scenario
depicted in section 2. The author did not explore
what could have been done with that model, using
it as a intermediate stage later to be reinterpreted
as if it were a model multiagent interaction. In
particular, Prakken’s main goal was to allow the
agents taking part in this interaction to dynami-
cally modify their knowledge bases.
Finally, we too have pursued a similar line of
research over a series of articles [15, 13, 16, 14],
striving to define an abstract model for the agent
interaction in multiagent systems. Even though
an intermediate model of dialectical reasoning
was also introduced, it never became the main
focus of our attention, whereas now we intend to
explore its potential to the fullest extent.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
In this article we have briefly sketched a research
line for developing an abstract semantics for argu-
mentative systems. To do so, we intend to take
advantage of the fact that most argumentative
systems allow some sort of dialectical recast of
their original semantics. We figure that by devel-
oping a sufficiently generic model of the process
of dialectical reasoning, we may end up charac-
terizing an abstract semantics for these systems.
As a future work, we ought to refine the prelim-
inary work outlined in section 2, so to formally
define an abstract model of dialectical reasoning
in accord to those guidelines.
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